kARGIL WAR
15 YEARS ONStrategic lessons that we need to learn
Operation Vijay, the Indian codename of the war, was a blend of strong and determined political, military and diplomatic actions which enabled us to transform an adverse situation into an emphatic military and diplomatic victory
Operation Vijay, the Indian codename of the war, was a blend of strong and determined political, military and diplomatic actions which enabled us to transform an adverse situation into an emphatic military and diplomatic victory
General V.P. Malik
Artillery helped the Indian Army to drive away the intruders. The regiments that took part in the Kargil conflict. Tribune photos Sophisticated weapons were recovered from various sites that were occupied |
THE
Kargil war, forced on India by Pakistan 15 years ago, will always be
remembered for (a) its strategic and tactical surprise (b) the
self-imposed national strategy of restraint keeping the war limited to
the Kargil-Siachen sector (c) military strategy and planning in keeping
with the political mandate and the (d) dedication, determination, and
daring junior leadership at the tactical level.
In
fiercely fought combat actions, on the most difficult terrain that gave
immense advantage to the enemy holding mountaintops, we were able to
evict Pakistani troops from most of their surreptitiously occupied
positions. The Pakistani leadership was forced to sue for ceasefire and
seek withdrawal of its troops from the remaining areas.
Diplomatic victory
Operation
Vijay, the Indian codename of the war, was a blend of strong and
determined political, military and diplomatic actions which enabled us
to transform an adverse situation into an emphatic military and
diplomatic victory. As two Prime Ministers of Pakistan later
acknowledged, “Kargil war was Pakistan's biggest blunder and disaster.”
In this
article, I will briefly narrate two of the most important battles of the
war, some important strategic lessons and how do we look ahead.
The Battle of Tololing
Tololing
Top in Dras, occupied by the enemy, interfered with our vehicular
movements on the Srinagar-Kargil highway and overlooked the town and our
logistic positions. It was necessary to recapture it as early as
possible and thus it became the first major battle. After 18 Grenadiers
set the stage, 2 Raj Rif finished the task against overwhelming odds on
June 13, 1999, after three weeks of bitter fighting. 2 Raj Rif captured a
large quantity of weapons and ammunition, including rocket launchers
and 81mm mortars held only by Pakistan's regular forces. This large haul
of weapons and some vital documents, shattered the myth that Pakistan
had created assiduously that the men who had intruded across the LoC
were jihadi militants.
Anxiety about battle
We were
anxious throughout this battle. As the Army Chief, I could not afford to
convey my feelings to anyone, nor could I interfere with the battle
which had been planned and conducted at the brigade and division levels.
The list of casualties kept growing. We lost three officers, four
junior commissioned officers and 16 other ranks. The enemy losses, based
on the number of bodies recovered were put at 27.
Tololing
Top was the first turning point in the Kargil war. The events that
transpired during the battle made me think of the difficult days ahead
when we had to clear the enemy from other areas. But realising the
determination and the fighting spirit of our troops, I was convinced
that we could do it.
Capture of Tiger Hill
The Tiger
Hill, an awe-inspiring steep mountain top within our territory, was
considered as a major thorn and the most difficult feature occupied by
the enemy in the Mushkoh-Dras sector. During my visit to the front on
June 28, 1999, Major-General Mohinder Puri, GOC 8 Mtn Div, told me that
the Tiger Hill would be his next objective.
The
attack on Tiger Hill started on June 30/July 1. The objective was
engaged effectively by the Air Force and with intense indirect as well
as direct artillery fire. The infantry assault went in on July 3.
At 6 am
on July 4, I was informed that 18 Grenadiers had captured the Tiger Hill
Top but heavy fighting was still going on the feature. I spoke to GOsC
15 Corps and 8 Mtn Div to learn about the latest situation and asked
them to let me know when the objective would be fully secured. At 7.30
am, Mohinder Puri confirmed that the enemy would not be able dislodge
our troops from the Tiger Hill Top.
I then
informed the Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee who was scheduled to
address a public meeting at 10 am. The Defence Minister was flying to
Amritsar. I gave him this news when he landed at the airport.
Blow to Pakistan
That date
became important for one more reason: Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif was to meet the US President Bill Clinton. Before their meeting,
the National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra and I made sure that the
whole world came to know about the recapture of Tiger Hill and thus the
likely outcome of the war.
The loss
of Tiger Hill was a hard physical and psychological blow to the Pakistan
Army. In India, jubilation and relief replaced the earlier gloomy mood
of the people. After the entire Tiger Hill feature had been cleared by 4
Sikh and 2 Naga battalions, 18 Grenadiers proudly hoisted the Indian
tricolour on the Tiger Hill Top.
Holistic national review needed
Many
lessons have emerged from the Kargil war which necessitated a holistic
national security review as well as rethinking on the nature of conflict
in the new strategic environment and the conduct of such wars.:
n There
may be remote chances of a full-scale conventional war between two
nuclear weapon states but as long as there were territory-related
disputes — currently we have them with China and Pakistan — the
adversary can indulge in a proxy war, a limited conventional border war,
or both.
n A major
military challenge in India is the political reluctance to a proactive
grand strategy or engagement. It has invariably led us to a reactive
military situation. This disadvantage is enhanced manifold because no
loss of territory is acceptable to the public and the political
authority. This is a strategic handicap and a risk in any war setting,
which increases in a limited-war scenario. To deal with such situations,
it is essential to have credible strategic and tactical intelligence
and assessments, effective surveillance and close defence of the lines
of control.
n The
successful outcome of a border war depends upon our ability to react
rapidly. The new strategic environment calls for faster decision making,
versatile combat organisations, rapid deployment and synergy amongst
all elements involved in the war effort, particularly the three
services.
n
Military capabilities cannot be built when the conflict is on. This can
be done only through careful assessment of likely contingencies and
defence planning.
n Any war
in future will require close political oversight and
politico-civil-military interaction. It is, therefore, essential to keep
the military leadership in the security and strategic decision-making
loop.
n India
has a National Security Council but there is no official document
outlining its broad national security (including defence) policy and
strategy. The government has hesitated in spelling it out due to the
lack of political consensus on its policies and the inability to address
the crucial issues of coordination to formulate and address national
security. The absence of a coherent policy tends to make our responses
ad hoc and less convincing.
All-weather surveillance
Kargil
war had highlighted gross inadequacies in all-weather surveillance
capabilities. Since then, this capability has been made up with
indigenous satellites and aerial imagery with synthetic aperture radar.
We have also acquired effective unmanned aerial vehicles, and most
importantly, acquired and deployed hand-held thermal imagers,
surveillance radars and ground sensors along the lines of control.
Individual service and joint services doctrines have been revised. Some
Special Forces units have been added to the strength of each service.
At the
politico-military strategic level, however, the situation is dismal.
Most of the reforms recommended in the National Security Review in 2002
to improve the higher defence control organisation, its systems and
processes were either not implemented or implemented only cosmetically.
There is no policy document or a white paper on broad national security policy and strategy for the near or long term.
The
Ministry of Defence has not been integrated meaningfully nor is there
any improvement in defence planning and procurement systems. The civil
and military relations have worsened.
Over the
last 15 years, due to reactive security postures, our deterrent
capabilities have been eroded. This tends to encourage our adversaries
to take liberties on the disputed borders or through cross-border proxy
war. We need to build credible deterrence at the political as well as
military levels.
In June
2012, the government appointed the Naresh Chandra Committee to carry out
yet another national security review. Till date, its recommendations
have neither been de-classified nor implemented. A strong, competent and
committed political leadership is required to bring about improvements
in the security policies, higher defence control organisation and its
systems, including its rules of business.
— The writer was the Army Chief during the Kargil war
After the conflict
- The Kargil war had highlighted gross inadequacies in all-weather surveillance capabilities. Since then, this capability has been made up with indigenous satellites and aerial imagery with synthetic aperture radar.
- We have also acquired effective unmanned aerial vehicles,
- In June 2012, the government appointed the Naresh Chandra Committee to carry out yet another national security review. Till date, its recommendations have neither been de-classified nor implemented
- Military capabilities cannot be built when the conflict is on. This can be done only through careful assessment of likely contingencies and defence planning.
- http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140723/edit.htm#7
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